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Antenuptial Contracts and Divorce
in Kentucky: A Better Approach
The antenuptial contract was a wicked device to evade the
laws applicable to marriage relations, property rights, and
divorces, and is clearly against public policy and decency.
It was nothing more, in effect, than an attempt on the part
of the [husband] . . . to legalize prostitution, under the
name' of marriage .... 1
INTRODUCTION
Although describing an antenuptial contract drawn decid-
edly in favor of the husband,2 the above excerpt reflected the
generally accepted view of antenuptial contracts contemplat-
ing divorce in the first half of this century.3 While antenuptial
contracts settling property rights in the event of either
spouse's death were favored by the courts,4 contracts settling
property or support rights upon divorce led to their being
held void ab initio because of the courts' concerns that such
contracts would encourage and facilitate divorce. With the
In re Duncan's Estate, 285 P. 757, 757 (Colo. 1930). An antenuptial (or prenup-
tial) agreement is an agreement between prospective spouses, "or between both or
either of them and a third party, entered into before marriage, but in contemplation
and in consideration thereof, whereby the property [or other] rights of one or both of
the prospective spouses are determined." 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at 90-26 (1982).
2 See 285 P. at 757 (contract provided for separation in the event of marital
discord, with the wife accepting a payment of $100 for each year of marriage, and
relinquishing all other claims for maintenance, dower or widow's rights).
S Any provision in an antenuptial agreement predetermining alimony or property
settlement in the event of divorce is generally held to be unenforceable. See 2 A.
LINDEY, supra note 1, § 90, at 90-33. See also Oliphant v. Oliphant, 7 S.W.2d 783, 788
(Ark. 1928); French v. McAnarney, 195 N.E. 714, 716 (Mass. 1935); Fricke v. Fricke,
42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950). For a discussion of the validity of these contracts see
generally 17 AM. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 16 (1930); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2D 942
(1958); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 533 (1935); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931).
4 See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962); Kuhnen
v. Kuhnen, 184 N.E. 874, 877-78 (Ill. 1933); Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522, 525-28
(Ky. 1916); Stewart v. Stewart, 23 S.E.2d 306, 308-09 (N.C. 1942); Leonard v. Pren-
tice, 43 P.2d 776, 778-80 (Okla. 1935).
1 See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d at 502. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2D
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advent of no-fault divorce laws and the changes in society
which such laws represent, this strict prohibition has gradu-
ally given way to an ad hoc analysis of these contracts by
many courts."
The Kentucky Court's resistance to this trend is apparent
in a 1981 decision, Jackson v. Jackson. In Jackson, the Court
was called on to assess the validity of an antenuptial contract
which provided, in part, that the husband would "'furnish
[his intended spouse] a decent support during his natural
life.'" The agreement served to release all property rights
upon the death of either spouse, and the provision for "decent
support" was not contingent on divorce or separation of the
parties. The Court upheld a lower court's enforcement of the
support provision during a divorce action, but in so doing the
Court also reaffirmed Stratton v. Wilson,9 a 1916 decision
voiding antenuptial contracts in consideration of divorce.' 0
The Stratton decision dealt with an antenuptial contract
in which the wife released all her estate rights in exchange for
$25,000 payable upon her husband's death. The contract also
provided that she would accept $10,000 in relinquishment of
all alimony, maintenance, and attorney fees in the event of
divorce." Upon the husband's death, his niece sought to en-
942, 943 (1958) (upholding such provisions could encourage a property owning spouse
to provoke or openly seek a divorce).
6 See, e.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751-52 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980);
Spector v. Spector, 531 P.2d 176, 181-85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Newman v. Newman,
653 P.2d 728, 731-36 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11-13
(Conn. 1980); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719, 720-22 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976);
Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1088-91 (D.C. 1980); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d
381, 382-86 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Scherer v.
Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 664-67 (Ga. 1982); Rossiter v. Rossiter, 666 P.2d 617, 620-22
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46-48 (IMI. App. Ct. 1972);
Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785, 788-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Matlock v.
Matlock, 576 P.2d 629, 632-34 (Kan. 1978); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 814-
17 (Mass. 1981); Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 571-72 (Minn. 1980); Buettner v.
Buettner, 505 P.2d 600, 604-05 (Nev. 1973); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719, 721-
22 (Or. 1973); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467-68 (Wyo. 1979).
626 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1981).
8 Id. at 631.
9 185 S:W. 522 (Ky. 1916).
10 626 S.W.2d at 632.
11 185 S.W. at 522.
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force the estate settlement clause of the contract.12 The court
found the contract's alimony clause void, "as the law will not
permit parties contemplating marriage to enter into a contract
providing for, and looking to, future separation after mar-
riage." ' s Nevertheless, by holding the contract clauses separa-
ble, the Court was able to uphold the estate settlement
clause. 114
The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the Jackson agree-
ment by focusing on the agreement's failure to mention di-
vorce or separation1 5 and, thus, able to reconcile its holding
with Stratton, finessed the more difficult task of reexamining
the Stratton doctrine. Although it implied a willingness to
make such a reexamination of Stratton, the Kentucky Court
in Jackson chose not to do SO. 1 6 The prevalence of divorce in
recent history,17 the adoption of no-fault divorce in Ken-
tucky, 8 and the changing status of women in today's society19
12 Id. at 524.
13 Id. at 525.
14 Id. at 525-26.
12 626 S.W.2d at 632.
"Id. As of this writing, the latest Kentucky case dealing with antenuptial con-
tracts contemplating divorce was Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983). The Kentucky Court of Appeals did not address the validity issue since it held
the contract to have been revoked. Id. at 258.
127 Nationally, the divorce rate per 1,000 married women, 15 years old and over
had risen from 9.2% in 1960 to 22.8% in 1979. See DEPARTMENT O COMMERCE, BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 82 (103d ed. 1982-
83) (table no. 124). This raised the number of divorced persons per 1,000 married
persons from 35 in 1960 to 109 in 1981. See id. at 40 (table no. 51).
In Kentucky, the number of divorces almost doubled between 1965 and 1979.
There were 8,300 divorces in 1965 as compared with 16,000 in 1979. See id. at 84
(table no. 127) (1979 statistic is incomplete). In the same time frame, marriages only
increased from 28,300 to 34,000, less than a 25% increase. See id. at 83 (table no. 126)
(1960 statistic is based on the number of marriage licenses; 1979 statistic is
incomplete).
More importantly for antenuptial contract purposes, widowed and divorced
women comprised 20.3% of the female population above the age of 18 in 1981, and,
the number of remarriages of women almost tripled from 1960 to 1979, increasing
from 197,000 to 582,000. See id. at 38, 82 (table nos. 49 & 124) (remarriage statistics
are skewed since 1960 figures include 33 states including New York but exclude New
York City; 1979 statistics include 42 states and the District of Columbia).
18 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.150, .170 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
" Inherent in the policy prohibiting antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce
is a paternalistic attitude toward women. This attitude is no longer warranted. See,
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dictate a reexamination of Stratton's prohibition of antenup-
tial contracts contemplating divorce.
This Note traces the historical development of the public
policy invalidation of antenuptial contracts contemplating di-
vorce. It examines the rationale behind this public policy and
questions the validity of this rationale in light of contempo-
rary reality. In addition, it reviews the recent trend towards
validation of these contracts and discusses the various ap-
proaches used by the courts, legislatures, and commentators.
Concluding that the underlying rationale for per se invalida-
tion of antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce is no
longer sound, this Note proposes a treatment more consistent
with present public policy as expressed by current legislation.
I. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS AND
PUBLIC POLICY
A. The Common Law
At common law, two policies weighed against the validity
of antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce. First, a mar-
riage valid in its inception was indissoluble, as divorce was a
"matrimonial cause" cognizable only in the Ecclesiastical
Courts and the Church refused to recognize an absolute di-
vorce.20 This "state" interest in the preservation of marriage
has continued, albeit statutorily altered regarding dissolubil-
ity, into the present day and is the basis for the public policy
underlying decisions invalidating antenuptial contracts.2 1 Sec-
ond, common law coverture merged the wife's identity with
the husband's, not only depriving the spouses of the capacity
of making contracts during marriage, but also extinguishing
any preexisting agreement between them.22 Statutory law has
since abolished this common law rule.23 However, the concept
of marriage as the foundation of both the family and society
e.g., Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d at 720-21; Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 46-
47; Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d at 468.
20 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257
So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
21 Id.
22 See 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 1, § 90, at 90-27 to -28.
23 Id. at 90-28.
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remains unchanged. 4
B. Early Decisions
The state's asserted interest in the preservation of mar-
riage was the basis for numerous early decisions invalidating
antenuptial agreements contemplating divorce-whether re-
lating to support or property rights.2 5 In Oliphant v. Oli-
phant,2' previously married and divorced parties executed an
antenuptial agreement whereby the wife waived her rights of
homestead, dower and alimony in the event of divorce. The
court held that an antenuptial contract governing the disposi-
tion of property only in case of a divorce is contrary to public
policy and is, therefore, void.27
In addition, courts felt that the majority of antenuptial
contracts would not be equally favorable to both spouses,
thereby promoting divorce by making it profitable for one of
the spouses to cause a separation and reap the rewards of the
agreement.28 This concept was reflected in the Restatement of
Contracts, which provided that "[a] bargain between. .. per-
sons contemplating marriage, for separation or divorce is ille-
gal." 29 This provision was followed by an illustration:
A and B who are about to marry enter an antenuptial bar-
gain providing that if they find it impossible to live together
amicably, and therefore separate, their respective interests
in what they own shall remain as they were before marriage.
The bargain is illegal since its tendency is to lead to
separation.30
Two early California cases echo this sentiment. Pereira v.
Pereira3 1 involved a reconciliation agreement providing for a
$10,000 settlement in satisfaction of the wife's alimony, costs,
fees, and property rights should the husband give the wife a
24 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 382.
25 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3.
26 7 S.W.2d 783 (Ark. 1928).
11 Id. at 788.
28 See, e.g., id. at 788-89.
28 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 584(1) (1932).
30 Id. § 584 illustration 2.
31 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909).
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
new cause of action for divorce.2 The court viewed this agree-
ment as being conducive to divorce, since at the time of the
agreement the wife's share of the community property was
worth at least $28,500. 33 Finding that if the husband "should,
after its execution, be moved by evil impulses to commit anew
the offenses against his wife which first gave her cause for di-
vorce . . . the existence of a valid contract of this sort could
not but encourage him to yield to his baser inclinations, and
inflict the injury, '3 4 the court held the contract void. In Whit-
ing v. Whiting,3 5 an antenuptial agreement, providing for a
$5,000 payment to the wife in lieu of her claims to any fees,
alimony, or property rights upon separation, divorce, or death,
was held promotive of divorce and void.36
Kentucky's highest court has viewed such contracts in a
similar vein. In Stratton v. Wilson,31 the court considered its
invalidation of contracts providing for future separation after
marriage
but a manifestation of a long-settled policy of the law to the
effect that it is beneficial to society that the marital relation
should not be disturbed or its happiness marred, but that it
should be upheld and encouraged, and that the parties to it
should not be led into the breaking of the vows by the allur-
ments [sic] of any stipulations which they may enter into
before marriage. 38
The fear that antenuptial contract provisions would tempt
husbands to either desert their wives, or compel their wives to
leave them, in order to secure a profit, was a pervasive theme
in these early cases. 9 This fear, coupled with the state's inter-
32 Id. at 489.
11 See id. at 490.
34 Id.
35 216 P. 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
36 Id. at 96.
37 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916). See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra for a discus-
sion of the decision.
SS 185 S.W. at 525.
See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 243 P. 402, 404 (Ariz. 1926); In re Duncan's
Estate, 285 P. 757, 758 (Colo. 1930); Watson v. Watson, 77 N.E. 355, 356-57 (Ind.
App. 1906); Fincham v. Fincham, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (Kan.), modified, 173 P.2d 244
(Kan. 1946); Neddo v. Neddo, 44 P. 1 (Kan. 1896); Cohn v. Cohn, 121 A.2d 704, 707
(Md. 1956).
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est in preserving marriages, continues to greatly influence the
courts today.
II. THE TREND TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE
A. Bucking the Trend: Decisions Refusing Validation
Both the paternalistic attitude toward women and the
state interest in marriage persevered into the second half of
this century. In a 1950 decision, Fricke v. Fricke,40 the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin found an antenuptial contract enti-
tling the wife to $2,000 if the marriage ended in divorce to be
void as against public policy.41 Citing the language of one of
its previous decisions,42 the court based its decision on the
state's interest in the marital contract and its control over the
husband's obligation to his wife:43
The law requires a husband to support, care for, and provide
comforts for his wife in sickness, as well as in health. This
requirement is grounded upon principles of public policy.
The husband cannot shirk it, even by contract with his wife,
because the public welfare requires that society be thus pro-
tected so far as possible from the burden of supporting those
of its members who are not ordinarily expected to be wage
earners, but may still be performing some of the most im-
portant duties pertaining to the social order.4
The court concluded that, regardless of the circumstances mo-
tivating its adoption or attending its execution, an antenuptial
contract is aimed at limiting the husband's liability in the
event of divorce or separation and is, consequently, void as
against public policy.45
Despite its patronizing attitude towards women, the
Fricke rationale was recently applied by the Wisconsin court
in Kunde v. Kunde.46 Although the court allowed the provi-
sions of an antenuptial agreement to be considered as a factor
40 42 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 1950).
41 Id. at 502.
42 Ryan v. Dockery, 114 N.W. 820, 821 (Wis. 1908).
4S 42 N.W.2d at 501.
44 Id. at 502.
45 Id.
46 191 N.W.2d 41 (Wis. 1971).
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in a divorce proceeding property settlement, the court held
that the agreement was against public policy and could not
govern the division of the parties' estate.4"
Nebraska also retains a blanket prohibition against ante-
nuptial agreements contemplating divorce. In the recent case
of Mulford v. Mulford,48 the Nebraska Supreme Court sum-
marily dealt with this issue, noting that "[i]t is generally held
that antenuptial agreements providing in the event of divorce
or separation the spouse should forfeit his or her rights in the
property of the other are contrary to public policy and void as
tending to promote divorce." '49 Citing a 1958 A.L.R. annota-
tion, the court found this to be the majority rule."
However, most of the recent case law nullifying antenup-
tial contracts contemplating divorce does so only with respect
to alimony or support provisions, not property settlement
provisions.1 This distinction is based upon the longstanding
acceptance of antenuptial contracts providing for property di-
vision upon the death of a spouse.52 This acknowledged ability
to contract away property rights upon death has been, in
many jurisdictions, logically extended to contracts contem-
plating divorce. 3 In addition, divorce legislation enacted in
many jurisdictions lists property agreements as a factor influ-
encing the property settlement of the parties.5 4 Tennessee is
an example of a jurisdiction that prohibits antenuptial con-
tracts concerning alimony, while holding contracts settling
property valid. In Crouch v. Crouch,55 antenuptial property
settlements were found to be favored by public policy,5 but
47 Id. at 42.
48 320 N.W.2d 470 (Neb. 1982).
49 Id. at 471.
50 See id. (citing Annot., supra note 5, at 942).
" See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
52 See the authorities cited in note 4 supra and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Spector v. Spector, 531 P.2d 176, 179-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Mc-
Hugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 11-12 (Conn. 1980); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352
N.E.2d 785, 790-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Matlock v. Matlock, 576 P.2d 629, 633 (Kan.
1978).
N See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 142
(1973).
5 385 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
"' See id. at 293.
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an antenuptial contract limiting the husband's liability for ali-
mony was held to be promotive of divorce and void. 57 Tennes-
see's continuing adherence to this approach is shown in the
recent case of Duncan v. Duncan5s where the rule prohibiting
alimony provisions was extended to void a provision control-
ling attorney fees. 59 At the same time, the Tennessee court
noted the legislature's recent express approval of property set-
tlement provisions in antenuptial contracts and put to rest
any doubts as to the validity of such provisions.6 0
While neither expressly authorizing nor prohibiting an
antenuptial agreement property division, both South Dakota
and Louisiana recently reaffirmed their paternalistic attitude
concerning support provisions in antenuptial contracts.6 ' The
South Dakota court, drawing upon the tenor of its statutes
and past decisions to determine public policy, concluded that
a provision in an antenuptial agreement purporting to limit
the husband's obligation to support his wife was void.6 2 Simi-
57 See id. With regard to an antenuptial contract that limits the husband's liabil-
ity for alimony in case of divorce, the court opined:
Such contract could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any
wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be
limited. In other words, a husband could through abuse and ill treatment of
his wife force her to bring an action for divorce and thereby buy a divorce
for a sum far less than he would otherwise have to pay.
Id.
58 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
11 See id. at 915 (citing Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d at 294).
60 See id. where the court cites TENN. COnE ANN. § 36-606 (Supp. 1983) which
provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny antenuptial or prenuptial agreement entered into by spouses
concerning property owned by either spouse before the marriage which is
the subject of such agreement shall be binding upon any court having juris-
diction over such spouses and/or such agreement if such agreement is deter-
mined in the discretion of such court that it was entered into by such
spouses freely, knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion of
duress or undue influence upon either spouse.
Id.
41 See Holiday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Connolly v. Connolly, 270
N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978).
62 270 N.W.2d at 47-48. Expressing its paternalistic attitude toward women, the
court declared: "We conclude that to insure that the public's interest in the enforce-
ment of a husband's duty to support his wife is not thwarted by antenuptial agree-
ments that may bear no reasonable relationship to the subsequent situation of the
parties, we must hold that such agreements are void and unenforceable." Id. at 47.
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larly, the Louisiana court voided an antenuptial contract
which waived a wife's right to alimony pendente lite in the
event of judicial separation .6  The Louisiana court declared
that it was the public policy of the state that a husband
should support and assist his wife during the existence of the
marriage.6 4
In Norris v. Norris,6 5 the Iowa Supreme Court voided an
antenuptial contract in which each party waived his or her
right to the other's property in the event of divorce.6 Conced-
ing that, generally, antenuptial contracts are favored in law
and should be construed liberally to carry out the intention of
the parties, the court nevertheless concluded that this con-
tract was contrary to public policy.17 Construing a contract
that waived property rights to also include a waiver of ali-
mony rights, the Iowa court based its decision on three
grounds. First, the state's interest in preserving the marriage
relationship rendered contrary to public policy and void any
provision that provided for, facilitated, or tended to induce
divorce of the parties after marriage.6 Second, it was against
public policy to force a party to endure an unhappy marriage
to avoid an unfavorable contract.6 9 Finally, the public interest
03 358 So. 2d at 620.
" See id. The court explained that the public policy involved was "that condi-
tions which affect entitlement to alimony pendente lite cannot be accurately foreseen
at the time antenuptial agreements are entered, and the public interest in enforce-
ment of the legal obligation to support overrides the premarital anticipatory waiver of
alimony." Id.
The dissent strongly objected to this "demeaning" attitude of the majority as
being inconsistent with today's reality: "It is simply not correct to assume that all, or
most, women are incapable of financial independence but must, instead, be wholly
dependent upon either their husbands or the state." Id. at 622. (Calogero, J.,
dissenting).
65 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970).
06 Id. at 370.
67 Id.
68 Id.
09 Id. The court stated:
It is also against public policy to place an innocent party in a position
where he or she would be forced to endure conduct which would constitute
grounds for divorce because of fear that the commencement of an action
would deprive the person of contracted property rights and means of
support.
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prohibited enforcement of an agreement relieving the hus-
band of his duty to support his wife. °
Whether invalidating only support provisions or invali-
dating both the support and property provisions, these cases
are presently in the minority. The bulk of the recent case law
has upheld antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce, as
the courts have reasoned that past public policy does not
comport with present reality.71
B. The Trend: Decisions Validating Antenuptial Contracts
In contrast to the small number of jurisdictions since
1970 that have found provisions in antenuptial contracts con-
templating divorce to be void per se,72 many states have reex-
amined the rationale employed to invalidate these contracts
and found it wanting."3 The jurisdictions validating antenup-
tial contracts can be divided into two groups: those states that
permit property provisions but have not ruled upon the valid-
ity of alimony provisions, and those states that accept both
property and alimony provisions (the larger group).
Illustrative of the former group is Spector v. Spector.7 4 In
this Arizona decision, the court agreed with the traditional
rule that agreements between spouses which either provide for
or tend to induce divorce or separation are contrary to public
policy.7 5 However, the court also concluded that the contrac-
tual freedom conveyed to spouses by its case law, together
with the legislative recognition of the equality of marriage
partners as evidenced by Arizona's no-fault divorce laws, re-
flected a public policy permitting the enforcement of an ante-
nuptial contract concerning the property of the spouses. 6 The
70 Id.
71 See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72 See text accompanying notes 40-70 supra for a discussion of the leading cases
in these jurisdictions.
7' See cases cited supra note 6.
71 531 P.2d 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
71 See id. at 181.
71 Id. at 180-81. The court noted:
The institution of marriage is of vital interest to the state and nation since
our family and social organization is built upon it. If agreements between
spouses provided for or tended to induce divorce or separation, that would
1983-841
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court found no reason why an antenuptial contract should be
accorded different legal treatment than a postnuptial
contract."
Indiana similarly upholds antenuptial contracts concern-
ing property rights while reserving the issue of alimony rights.
In Tomlinson v. Tomlinson,75 the Indiana court held that an
antenfuptial agreement which spoke to a proposed property di-
vision was "to be presumed valid unless surrounding circum-
stances show it to have been entered without full knowledge
or entered as the result of fraud, duress, or coercion. '79 The
Tomlinson court justified its decision by describing the
changes in society that had led to a new public policy. 0 Since
the antenuptial contract in Tomlinson did not fix any support
or alimony rights, the Indiana court did not directly address
that issue. 1
Despite its acceptance of antenuptial contracts fixing
property rights upon divorce, the Indiana court held that such
an agreement was not binding upon the court.2 The court
reasoned that "[s]ince circumstances existent at the time of
divorce may be substantially different than those which ex-
isted at the time of the agreement, a valid agreement is but
one factor to be considered among the several factors upon
which the court customarily relies to make an equitable distri-
bution of property." 3
Minnesota and Wyoming are also within the jurisdictions
that have validated agreements fixing property rights but
be contrary to public policy. But where the prospective marriage partners
wish to consider and adjust by legal agreement their respective rights in
advance of marriage, we believe that the institution of marriage is thereby
strengthened, not weakened. Under such circumstances such agreements
are consistent with public policy, not contrary to it.
Id. at 181.
77 Id. at 183.
78 352 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
79 Id. at 791.
80 Id. at 789-91.
81 See id. at 790. However, the Tomlinson court, in dictum, declared: "[W]hether
a particular antenuptial agreement concerns property distribution or alimony... we
deem the changed and changing status of the male vis-a-vis the female" to be signifi-
cant. Id.
82 See id. at 791.
83 Id.
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have not ruled upon those fixing support or alimony. In
Hafner v. Hafner,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court held valid
an antenuptial agreement that provided each party would re-
tain their respective property as if no marriage had taken
place, despite the fact that the wife was not told of her rights
absent the agreement.15 The court found little difference be-
tween this contract and a marriage settlement, noting that it
had "repeatedly acknowledged that such agreements promote
important social functions."'86 Likewise, in Laird v. Laird,87
the Supreme Court of Wyoming validated an antenuptial con-
tract by applying the same rules of construction as are applied
to other contracts.8 The assertion that an antenuptial con-
tract must be more closely scrutinized was rejected, since such
an assertion "springs from the archaic presumption of ine-
quality of husband and wife."8 The court concluded that the
contract was valid and enforceable because it was "under-
standingly made and freely executed." 90
The second and larger group of jurisdictions that vali-
dates antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce accepts
both property and alimony provisions in the contracts. With
the landmark decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Pos-
ner v. Posner"' setting the stage, thirteen jurisdictions92 have
84 295 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1980).
" See id. at 569-70.
86 Id. at 570. The court noted:
"Marriage settlements .. . are matters of history, and have been upheld
and sustained by the courts from the earliest times. They are not against
public policy, but, on the contrary, are regarded with favor, as being condu-
cive to the welfare of the parties and subservient to the best purposes of the
marriage relation, and are uniformly sustained when free from fraud or not
expressly prohibited by some statute."
Id. at 571 (quoting Appleby v. Appleby, 111 N.W. 305, 307 (Minn. 1907)).
87 597 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1979).
" See id. at 468.
88 Id.
80 See id.
81 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
' See, e.g., Barnhil v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Newman v.
Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8 (Conn. 1980);
Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff,
418 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1980); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662 (Ga.
1982); Rossiter v. Rossiter, 666 P.2d 617 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Volid v. Volid, 286
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ruled favorably on these contracts since 1970.
In Posner, the court explored the reasoning behind the
traditional rule that antenuptial agreements will not be up-
held because "contracts intended to facilitate or promote the
procurement of a divorce will be declared illegal as contrary to
public policy." 3 It examined the rationale set forth in Crouch
v. Crouch,94 wherein the Tennessee court expressed concern
that an antenuptial contract contemplating divorce would al-
low a husband to inflict any amount of abuse on his wife, fully
confident that he would not suffer monetarily in a divorce
settlement. 95
The Posner court responded to this fear by noting that an
equally unfair result could occur, if antenuptial contracts pro-
viding for property division upon the death of either spouse
were recognized, while those effective upon divorce were not:96
[I]t is not inconceivable that a dissatisfied wife-secure in
the knowledge that the provisions for alimony contained in
the antenuptial agreement could not be enforced against
her, but that she would be bound by the provisions limiting
or waiving her property rights in the estate of her hus-
band-might provoke her husband into divorcing her in or-
der to collect a large alimony check every month, or a lump-
sum award .. . rather than take her chances on being
remembered generously in her husband's will. In this situa-
tion, a valid antenuptial agreement limiting property rights
upon death would have the same meretricious effect, insofar
as the public policy in question is concerned, as would an
antenuptial divorce provision in the circumstance hypothe-
sized in Crouch v. Crouch .... 9
N.E.2d 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 576 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1978); Os-
borne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1973); Unander v. Unander,
506 P.2d 719 (Or. 1973).
In 1960, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that a just and reasonable ante-
nuptial contract providing for alimony and/or property division upon divorce would
be upheld by the courts. Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla. 1960).
a See 233 So. 2d at 382.
' 385 S.W.2d at,288. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Crouch case.
95 Id. at 293. See note 57 supra for the Crouch hypothetical.
0' 233 So. 2d at 383-84.
97 Id.
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While noting that the institution of marriage was still of
great importance to the state, the court also recognized that
the permanence of the institution has greatly diminished as of
late and that, consequently, many prospective marriage part-
ners might want to consider the disposition of their property
and maintenance rights in the event their marriage should
fail." While observing that agreements "withdrawing opposi-
tion to the divorce or not to contest it or to conceal the true
cause thereof by alleging another" ' were illegal as contrary to
public policy, the Florida court could find "no community or
society in which the public policy that condemned a husband
and wife to a lifetime of misery as an alternative to . . .di-
vorce still exists." 100 The court concluded that "antenuptial
agreements settling alimony and property rights of the parties
upon divorce. . . should no longer be held to be void ab initio
as contrary to public policy." 101
In the thirteen years since Posner, twelve other jurisdic-
38 See id. at 384. The Florida court declared "we cannot blind ourselves to the
fact that the concept of the 'sanctity' of a marriage-as being practically indissoluble,
once entered into-held by our ancestors only a few generations ago, has been greatly
eroded in the last several decades." Id.
9 See id. (quoting from Allen v. Allen, 150 So. 237, 238 (Fla. 1933)).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 385. The court added:
If such an agreement is valid when tested by the stringent rules pre-
scribed in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio ... for ante- and post-nuptial agree-
ments settling the property rights of the spouses in the estate of the other
upon death, and if, in addition, it is made to appear that the divorce was
prosecuted in good faith, on proper grounds, so that, under the rules appli-
cable to postnuptial alimony and property settlement agreement referred to
above, it could not be said to facilitate or promote the procurement of a
divorce, then it should be held valid as to conditions existing at the time
the agreement was made.
Id. The basic criteria in Del Vecchio is fairness between the parties, in addition to
the spouse's free and voluntary signature, preferably upon independent advice. See
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
The Posner court held that modification of such antenuptial agreements should
be decided under the laws governing the modification of "postnuptial contracts set-
tling the alimony and/or property rights of the parties." See 233 So. 2d at 385.
The concurring opinion in Posner stressed that such modification "should be ex-
ercised only in the face of the strongest and most compelling reasons." See id. at 387
(Spector, J., concurring specially).
The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Posner in Weintraub v.
Weintraub, 417 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1982).
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tions have followed Florida's lead.102 Two decisions among the
twelve, both decided within the last three years, stand out for
their logic and depth. In Osborne v. Osborne,103 Massachu-
setts' Supreme Judicial Court held that "an antenuptial con-
tract settling the alimony or property rights of the parties
upon divorce is not per se against public policy and may be
specifically enforced."'0 4 The court observed that in recent
years the legislature, by recognizing irretrievable breakdown
as a ground for divorce, had made divorce easier to obtain."0 5
In addition, the Massachusetts court responded to arguments
that had been made in favor of holding antenuptial contracts
void.1 6 Countering the contention that such contracts deni-
grated the status of marriage, the court noted that these con-
tracts were in aid of, rather than in derogation of, marriage.'0 7
In reply to the argument that such contracts tended to facili-
tate divorce, the court cited Posner to observe that such con-
tracts are no more likely to encourage divorce than antenup-
tial contracts in contemplation of death.10 Finally, the court
noted that such a contract could be modified by the courts in
special circumstances, such as "where it is determined that
the spouse is or will become a public charge," thus countering
the argument that a contract waiving or minimizing alimony
may turn a spouse into a ward of the state. 09
102 See note 92 supra for a list of the leading cases in each jurisdiction.
103 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981).
104 See id. at 816.
10I See id. at 815.
100 Id. at 814-16. The court articulated three "[traditional] reasons most fre-
quently given for invalidating such contracts... :(1) they... denigrate the status
of marriage, (2) they tend to facilitiate divorce by providing inducements to end the
marriage, and (3) a contract waiving or minimizing alimony may turn a spouse into a
ward of the State." Id. at 814.
'0 Id. at 815.
'8 See id. (citing Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 383-84).
109 Id. at 816. The court adopted the guidelines of a previous Massachusetts case
to be used in determining the extent to which such agreements should be enforced. In
addition to "fair disclosure" mandated by the parties' confidential relationship, other
relevant factors are whether
(1) it contains a fair and reasonable provision as measured at the time of
the execution for the party contesting the agreement; (2) the contesting
party was fully informed of the other party's worth prior to the agreement's
execution, or had, or should have had, independent knowledge of the other
party's worth; and (3) a waiver by the contesting party is set forth.
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Almost a year after the Massachusetts court decided Os-
borne, the Supreme Court of Colorado faced the same issue in
Newman v. Newman.110 In a well-reasoned opinion, the court
held that an antenuptial agreement contemplating divorce,
"freely executed by the parties and providing for terms of sep-
aration should the marriage fail," is not void as against public
policy in Colorado as long as the same standards set for simi-
lar contracts contemplating death are satisfied."' The terms
of the agreement in question had been suggested by the wife,
and provided that
upon dissolution [she] would receive the car, .... any gifts
given to her by her husband, all of her separately owned
property at the time of the marriage, $2,000 in cash, and
one-half of the balance, if any, of a joint savings account
into which all of her earnings during the marriage were to be
deposited.112
Unless she was disabled at the time of the divorce, the wife
was to receive no maintenance or other property." 3 The trial
court upheld the entire agreement, but the Court of appeals
struck the provision denying maintenance, as being against
public policy." 4
The Colorado Supreme Court first distinguished the 1930
case of In re Duncan's Estate,"5 which voided a similar ante-
nuptial contract. 1 6 Noting that the state of Colorado has an
interest in favoring the marriage relationship, the Newman
court reasoned that some couples would not marry if antenup-
tial agreements were not enforceable." 17 It then looked to
Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Mass. 1979). The reasonableness of any
monetary provision in the contract would also be judged by such factors as the worth,
age, intelligence, literacy, and business acumen of each of the parties. Id. at 389.
10 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982).
, See id. at 731.
112 Id. at 730.
11 Id. If disabled, the wife would receive payments of $500 per month from the
husband. Id.
"I See id.
115 285 P. 757 (Colo. 1930).
116 653 P.2d at 731 (distinction based on the fact that laws of marriage and
grounds for divorce in Colorado had been altered since the Duncan decision).
117 Id. The court attributed this both to the frequency of divorces and to the fact
that many people marry more than once. Id.
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other factors that favored validation of these contracts. The
court observed that the legislative statement of policy in the
Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), providing for
dissolution on grounds of irretrievable breakdown,"' was not
"eroded by agreements which anticipate and provide for...
economi - arrangements upon dissolution of a marriage.""" As
to the argument that such contracts encouraged divorce, the
court declared:
On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that such plan-
ning brings a greater stability to the marriage relation by
protecting the financial expectations of the parties, and does
not necessarily encourage or contribute to dissolution. In our
view, it is unlikely that an otherwise viable marriage would
be destroyed because of the potential for economic gain
through enforcement of the terms of the antenuptial
agreement. 120
The Colorado Supreme Court then considered separately
the standards for reviewing the validity of an antenuptial
agreement and reasoned that the standard for review of a
maintenance provision should be stricter than that for a prop-
erty division provision. 12
Of the remaining jurisdictions which have, in the wake of
Posner, fully accepted antenuptial contracts contemplating di-
vorce, 22 Hawaii is the most recent to do so. In a case of first
118 See COLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106(1)(a)(II) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
119 See 653 P.2d at 731-32.
120 Id. at 732.
1 See id. at 732-35 (reasoning that maintenance provisions may lose their legal
vitality by reason of changing circumstances which render them unconscionable at
the time of divorce).
122 In 1972, an Illinois court in Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42 (IM. App. Ct. 1972),
held that public policy was not violated by permitting persons with "families and
established wealth" to "anticipate the possibility of divorce and to establish their
rights by contract ... prior to marriage as long as the contract is entered with full
knowledge and without fraud, duress or coercion." Id. at 47. In reply to the oft-cited
reasons for holding support provisions in such contracts void, the court observed that
the argument that such agreements encourage divorce was based upon little empirical
evidence:
It is true that a person may be reluctant to obtain a divorce if he knows
that a great financial sacrifice may be entailed, but it does not follow from
this that a person who finds his marriage otherwise satisfactory will termi-
nate the marital relationship simply because it will not involve a financial
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sacrifice. It may be equally cogently argued that a contract which defines
the expectations and responsibilities of the parties promotes rather than
reduces marital stability.
Id. at 46. In response to the argument that the state has an interest in seeing that a
divorced woman has adequate support, the Illinois court discussed the changed status
of women in the economy and concluded that "[w]here a woman is trained, healthy,
and employable, and where a woman's efforts have not yet contributed to her hus-
band's wealth or earning potential, the necessity for an alimony award upon breakup
of the marriage is not great." Id. at 47.
In 1973, the high courts of Nevada and Oregon held that antenuptial agreements
settling property and maintenance rights upon divorce were not invalid. In Buettner
v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1973), the Supreme Court of Nevada quoted with
approval the language of Posner and concluded that such contracts were not void as
contrary to public policy. See id. at 603-04 (quoting Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at
384). However, the court "[retained] the power to refuse to enforce a particular ante-
nuptial contract [should it be] found unconscionable, obtained through fraud, misrep-
resentation, material nondisclosure or duress." Id. Only 21 days later the Supreme
Court of Oregon announced a similar decision. In Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719
(Or. 1973), the Oregon court overruled a decision only three years old, Reiling v. Rail-
ing, 474 P.2d 327 (Or. 1970). On reexamination of its previous rationale, the court
concluded that: (1) the argument that such contracts encourage divorce "is of ex-
tremely doubtful validity," (2) "the adoption of the 'no fault' concept of divorce is
indicative of the state's policy. . . that marriage between spouses who can't get along
is not worth preserving," and (3) the state's interest in the support of its citizens
"does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all antenuptial agreements concern-
ing alimony are invalid." See 506 P.2d at 721.
In 1976, the Connecticut Superior Court held that, in view of the relatively equal
status of women and men under the law, an antenuptial agreement controlling attor-
neys' fees, alimony, and premarital property was not void as against public policy.
See Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719, 721-22 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). Four
years later the Supreme Court of Connecticut reiterated this doctrine in McHugh v.
McHugh, 436 A.2d 8 (Conn. 1980). Faced with an antenuptial contract providing for
property rights upon dissolution of marriage, the court held such a contract
generally enforceable where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the contract
was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not violate statute or public pol-
icy; and (3) the circumstances of the parties at the time [of divorce] are not
so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice.
Id. at 11.
Subsequent years saw more states follow suit In 1978, the Supreme Court of
Kansas concluded that "the trial court did not err in upholding the antenuptial con-
tract of the parties and in denying alimony or a share of the husband's separate prop-
erty to the wife." See Matlock v. Matlock, 576 P.2d 629, 634 (Kan. 1978). In 1979, the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that a court will be bound by an antenuptial agree-
ment settling issues of property and maintenance upon divorce "if the provisions are
conscionable and if the agreement was fairly made." See Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d
782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
Both Alabama and the District of Columbia climbed on the bandwagon in 1980.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals declared that antenuptial agreements would be
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impression, Rossiter v. Rossiter,2" Hawaii's Intermediate
Court of Appeals noted the trend toward upholding such
agreements, but held that such an agreement, although valid,
is not binding upon the court. 2 "
If recent history is an accurate indication, judicial valida-
tion of antenuptial contracts governing maintenance or prop-
erty rights upon divorce will likely occur in yet other
jurisdictions.
C. The Restatement of Contracts: Following the Trend
An evolution in the Restatement of Contracts [Restate-
ment] supports this trend in the courts. In its initial version,
the Restatement provided that "[a] bargain between. . . per-
sons contemplating marriage, for separation or divorce is ille-
gal."125 An illustration in the comment following this rule con-
cluded that such an agreement is illegal, because any property
provision in an antenuptial agreement would encourage
separation. 26
held valid if the proponent is able to meet either of two tests: (1) "the consideration
was adequate and that the entire transaction was fair, just and equitable from the
[other spouse's] point of view," or (2) "the agreement was freely and voluntarily en-
tered into by the [other spouse] with competent independent advice and full knowl-
edge of [his or] her interest in the estate and its approximate value." See Barnhill v.
Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). Noting that public policy consid-
erations change along with societal conditions, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals looked first to the antenuptial contract's fairness in Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d
1085, 1089 (D.C. 1980). If the contract is fair to both parties, the party challenging
the contract must prove it was involuntarily entered into after less than full disclos-
ure. If the contract is one-sided, the proponent of the contract must show "that the
disadvantaged spouse signed freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the other's
assets." Id. at 1089.
Two years later Georgia joined the growing number of states accepting antenup-
tial contracts contemplating divorce with its decision in Scherer v. Scherer, 292
S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982). Approving the language of Posner and Valid, the Georgia Su-
preme Court overruled its 1961 decision, Reynolds v. Reynolds, 123 S.E.2d 115 (Ga.
1961), and held that "antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce are not
absolutely void as against public policy." See 292 S.E.2d at 666. For an in-depth dis-
cussion of this case, see Comment, Antenuptial Agreements and Divorce in Georgia:
Scherer v. Scherer, 17 GA. L. REv. 321 (1982).
122 666 P.2d 617 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983).
12, See id. at 621.
125 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 584(1) (1932).
1 See id. § 584 illustration 2. This illustration may be found in the text accom-
panying note 30 supra.
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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts [Restatement
(Second)] eliminated this blanket prohibition. Instead of find-
ing such contracts to be void per se, Restatement (Second)
section 190(1) declares "[a] promise by a person contemplat-
ing marriage. . is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
if it would change some essential incident of the marital rela-
tionship in a way detrimental to the public interest in the
marriage relationship. ' 127 The comment to this section ex-
plains that the rule "does not prevent persons contemplating
marriage .. .from making contracts between themselves for
the disposition of property, since this is not ordinarily re-
garded as an essential incident of the marital relationship. 1 2 s
Nor does the rule prevent contracts for services that are not
essential to the marriage; but it does preclude contracts from
changing, in a way detrimental to the public interest, the
spouses' duty of mutual support.12 9 Whether a change in the
duty of support will necessarily be detrimental to the public
interest will depend upon the circumstances of each case. An
example of detrimental change, based on In re Duncan's Es-
tate,130 is included in the comments:
A and B, who are about to marry, make an antenuptial
agreement in which A promises to leave their home at any
time on notice by B and to make no further claims against
B, and B promises thereupon to pay A $100,000. The
promises of A and B alter an essential incident of the mari-
tal relationship in a way detrimental to the public interest in
that relationship and are unenforceable on grounds of public
policy. 31
Restatement (Second) section 190(2) provides: "A promise
that tends unreasonably to encourage divorce or separation is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy." The comment ob-
serves that "[w]hether a promise tends unreasonably to en-
courage divorce or separation in a particular case is a question
1'7 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 190(1) (1981).
128 Id. § 190 comment a.
2' Id.
110 285 P. 757 (Colo. 1930).
131 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 comment a, Rlustration 1 (1981).
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of fact that depends upon all the circumstances" 132 and pro-
vides an example of a court's freedom to evaluate the facts:
A and B, who are about to be married, make an antenuptial
agreement in which A promises that in case of divorce, he
will settle $1,000,000 on B. A court may decide that, in view
of the large sum promised, A's promise tends unreasonably
to encourage divorce and is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy. 133
The reporter's note for the section goes on to find that,
because of changing social attitudes, what is "unreasonable" is
a variable concept.1 34 Thus, the Restatement of Contracts has
moved from a position totally opposed to antenuptial con-
tracts providing for divorce to a position of flexibility, tacitly
approving provisions for property division and looking at all
the factors when faced with a support provision.
III. A SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
ENFORCING ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS CONTINGENT UPON
DIVORCE
A. Arguments against Enforcement
The courts have enumerated four arguments in support
of the traditional view that antenuptial contracts contemplat-
ing divorce are void per se.
1. Such Antenuptial Contracts Tend to Encourage or
Facilitate Divorce
By far the most common objection to these agreements is
that they tend to encourage or facilitate divorce. 35 This argu-
"I See id. comment c.
133 See id. comment c, illustration 5 (1981).
134 Id. reporter's note (citing Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 381, and Volid v.
Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 42).
'" See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982); Posner v. Pos-
ner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla.
1972); Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (I1. App. Ct. 1972); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson,
352 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa
1970); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Mass. 1981); Ferry v. Ferry, 586
S.W.2d 782, 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (Or.
1973); Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 46 (S.D. 1978).
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ment must be divided into two separate parts. First, the ob-
jection that these contracts tend to encourage divorce has no
empirical basis. 136 Secondly, the argument that these con-
tracts tend to facilitate divorce must be conceded. However,
this argument is based upon public policy, and current public
policy, as evidenced by the vast majority of legislatures, ap-
proves of a trouble-free divorce through no-fault divorce
laws.137 Thus, facilitation of divorce can only promote public
policy.
2. Unfavored Spouses Will Become Wards of the State
Historically, courts feared that such contracts would be
unfavorable to the wife and that enforcement of the contract
would result in the wife's becoming a public charge.13 8 There
are three responses to this objection. First, women's roles have
changed, so that "[i]t will no longer do for courts to look on
women who are about to be married as if they were insensible
ninnies, pathetically vulnerable to overreaching by their
fiances and in need of special judicial protection."'3 9 Second,
allowing one-sided contracts to be modified, or providing for
invalidation of unconscionable contracts, would remedy this
objection."40 Finally, the same objection could be raised about
antenuptial contracts contemplating death, but these are gen-
erally enforced.'
3. Such Contracts Are Inconsistent with the Husband's
Duty to Support the Wife
This argument is similar to the one above, but places
136 See, e.g., Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 665 (Ga. 1982); Volid v. Volid,
286 N.E.2d at 46; Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d at 720.
137 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d at 731; Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d
at 384-85; Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 815; Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d at
720.
I"s See, e.g., Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 46; Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352
N.E.2d at 789; Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 814; Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d at
783.
13, In re Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d 623, 625 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982). See also
Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 46-47.
140 See Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d at 721.
z See, e.g., Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522, 525-28 (Ky. 1916).
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more emphasis on the traditional duty of the husband to sup-
port his wife.142 Again, the changing role of women has weak-
ened this objection.143
4. Such Contracts Denigrate the Status of Marriage
A less common reason given for invalidating such con-
tracts is that they denigrate the status of marriage.4 How-
ever, the inviolability of marriage has been weakened by the
many no-fault divorce laws in effect throughout the states,, 45
and such antenuptial contracts would do little to further this
erosion.
B. Arguments for Enforcement
In addition to the arguments that can be made in answer
to the objections to antenuptial contracts, several more points
weigh in favor of accepting such contracts. First, the freedom
to contract should not be curtailed without very strong rea-
sons.146 Second, rather than encouraging divorce, these con-
tracts will in many instances foster marriage. Some couples,
especially older ones who typically already have families and
property of their own, might choose to forego marriage unless
they are assured that they will be free to order their affairs as
they wish. An enforceable antenuptial contract can accom-
plish this goal and thus facilitate the marriage. 47 Third, the
law governing such contracts should be consistent with the
law governing antenuptial agreements made in anticipation of
142 See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d at 370; Holiday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d
618, 620 (La. 1978); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d at 720; Connolly v. Connolly, 270
N.W.2d 44, 46; Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950).
141 See, e.g., Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 46-47; Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352
N.E.2d at 789; Holiday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d at 622 (Cologero, J., dissenting); In re
Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d at 625.
144 See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 814; Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d
at 785.
141 See note 137 supra.
141 See Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976);
Holiday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d at 622 (Cologero, J., dissenting). See also Note, Mar-
riage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1161, 1204-09 (1974).
U7 See In re Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d at 625. See also Newman v. Newman,
653 P.2d at 731; Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d at 503 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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death.148 Finally, recognition of antenuptial contracts contem-
plating divorce would reduce litigation by avoiding property
and maintenance disputes where such contracts exist.14 9
IV. KENTUCKY LAW: PRESENT AND PROPOSED
A. Current Law
The present state of Kentucky's law regarding antenup-
tial contracts contingent upon divorce is less than clear. 50 Al-
though Jackson v. Jackson15 ' upheld an antenuptial contract
in which the husband promised to furnish his wife "a decent
support during his natural life,' 52 the Kentucky Court placed
heavy emphasis on the absence of language related to divorce:
It is to be noted that nowhere in this agreement is any
reference made to a divorce or separation of the parties. The
only reference in the agreement to support is the last sen-
tence, and there is nothing in the agreement that would lead
one to conclude that it was limited to a divorce or dissolu-
tion of the marriage of these parties. ""
The Jackson decision, reiterating the 1916 doctrine es-
poused in Stratton v. Wilson'5 and avoiding a reexamination
of the public policy rationale, leaves the practitioner confused.
It is impossible to advise his or her client as to how an ante-
nuptial agreement, providing for a property and/or mainte-
nance settlement in the event of divorce, will be treated in the
courts.
Despite Jackson's ambiguity concerning the future treat-
ment of these contracts, the decision made one thing clear.
Public policy remains the basis for generally holding such con-
"" See Buettner v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600, 603 (Nev. 1973); Fricke v. Fricke, 42
N.W.2d at 503-04 (Brown, J., dissenting).
119 See In re Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d at 626. See generally Moore, The En-
forceability of Premarital Agreements Contingent Upon Divorce, 10 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 11, 12-20 (1983).
150 See text accompanying notes 7-19 supra.
15 626 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1981).
152 Id. at 631.
253 Id.
1 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916). See text accompanying note 13 supra for a state-
ment of this doctrine.
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tracts void.155 The Restatement (Second) recently shed some
light on the use of public policy as a grounds for ruling that
contracts or their terms are unenforceable. It provides that
"[a] promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable
on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly out-
weighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms. ' 156 In weighing the interest in the
enforcement of a contract or term, the Restatement (Second)
provides that several factors be taken into account: "(a) the
parties' justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would
result if enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public
interest in the enforcement of the particular [contract].""5
Among the factors to be considered in weighing a public pol-
icy against enforcement of a contract are "(a) the strength of
that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions
[and] (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the [contract]
will further that policy."15 "Enforcement will be denied only
if the factors that argue against enforcement clearly outweigh
the law's traditional interest in protecting the expectations of
the parties. . .159
These guidelines permit a critical examination of Ken-
tucky's public policy. As evidenced by its adoption of no-fault
divorce, 60 the legislature chose to allow for the dissolution of
marriage with relative ease. In its statutory language dictating
the disposition of property upon divorce, the legislature de-
fined marital property to include "all property acquired by ei-
ther spouse subsequent to the marriage 1 61 except "[p]roperty
excluded by valid agreement of the parties." 2 Although pro-
viding no explanation of its provisions, the legislature did de-
l See 626 S.W.2d at 632.
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
157 Id. § 178(2).
188 Id. § 178(3).
155 Id. § 178 comment b (emphasis added).
185 See KRS §§ 403.150, .170.
181 See KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
162 KRS § 403.190(2)(d). This language tracks that contained in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 506(2), 9A U.L.A.
221 (1973) [hereinafter cited as UMDA].
[Vol 72
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
Clare that "[the no-fault divorce] act does not repeal any laws
relating to. . .the validity of premarital agreements between
spouses concerning their marital property rights. '1 3
Considering that "[t]he declaration of public policy has
now become largely the province of legislators rather than
judges, 1 64 it is obvious that the Stratton Court's declaration
of the state's interest in protecting marriage does not clearly
outweigh"65 either the law's interest in protecting the parties'
expectations or our Legislature's current declaration of public
policy. As the Restatement (Second) cautions, "courts should
not implement obsolete policies that have lost their vigor over
the course of years." 6
B. A Proposal
Having arrived at the inevitable conclusion that Ken-
tucky's law must be changed to reflect current public policy,
the question remains as to what this law should be. The fol-
lowing are offered as standards the courts should adopt for
the review of an antenuptial agreement contemplating
divorce:
1. The agreement must be in writing.
Kentucky law requires that any antenuptial contract set-
tling property rights be in writing,16 and there is no reason to
change this rule merely because the agreement contemplates
divorce.
2. The terms of the agreement cannot violate statute or
public policy.
Even if these agreements do not violate public policy per
se, their terms could. For example, provisions denying a duty
to support any children of the marriage or relieving one
16S See KRS § 403.010 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See also UMDA § 506(2), 9A U.L.A.
221 (1973).
164 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 comment b (1981).
'' This test is provided in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 comment
b (1981).
16 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 comment a (1981).
167 See generally Terry v. Terry, 95 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1936); Glazebrook v.
Glazebrook's Ex'r., 13 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1929).
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spouse of the duty to support the other during marriage
would violate public policy and be invalid.168
3. All provisions relating to property division are subject to
a fairness review as of the time of execution of the
agreement.
This fairness review would encompass the common con-
cerns of fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, overreach-
ing, sharp dealing, or the absence of full disclosure. The par-
ties' fiduciary relationship mandates full disclosure of assets,
although this need be neither minutely detailed nor exact." 9
Absent full disclosure, the proponent of the agreement must
prove the opponent had, or should have had, independent
knowledge of the other party's worth.170 In addition, the party
opposing the agreement "must have signed freely-and volun-
tarily."' 7 ' The fairness review should weigh the respective par-
ties' ages, health, experience, intelligence, literacy, and busi-
ness acumen, and should determine if each party had
independent and competent counsel (although this is not re-
quired) in deciding whether any overreaching occurred.I7 1
Fairness should be determined as of the time of the execution
of the agreement, so that even though the agreement might
later be considered imprudent, the court would not undo what
the parties had freely agreed to. 1' 3 This standard for property
division provisions is reflected by legislative policy.17 4
4. All provisions relating to maintenance are subject to an
unconscionability review as of the time of the dissolution of
the marriage.
The current public policy as declared by the legislature
makes no mention of antenuptial agreements concerning
268 See, e.g., McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 12 (Conn. 1980).
"I See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962).
170 See id. at 21.
17 Id. at 20.
17 See generally id. at 20; Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Mass.
1979).
17 Cf. Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707, 711-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
17 See text accompanying notes 160-66 supra.
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maintenance. 1 5 Although it does not proscribe such agree-
ments, the statute does allow for modification of separation
agreements respecting maintenance or support upon a show-
ing "of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing
as to make the terms unconscionable." " 6 By analogy, a main-
tenance provision in an antenuptial agreement that is uncon-
scionable at the time of divorce should not be enforced. This
approach is consistent with the state's interest in preventing a
spouse from becoming a public charge. Unconscionability may
be defined as "manifestly unfair and inequitable" and, thus, is
not solely the result of bad bargain.""' In addition, all mainte-
nance provisions must meet the standards of fairness estab-
lished for property provisions and must do so as of the time of
execution of the agreement. 8
CONCLUSION
Kentucky's refusal to enforce antenuptial contracts con-
templating divorce ignores a real need and, instead, clings to
an outdated public policy. The many authorities cited herein
attest to the conclusion that it is no longer valid merely to cite
outdated public policy rationales as a basis for rejecting these
agreements. Adoption of the proposed standards would ad-
vance the public policy evidenced in Kentucky's legislative en-
actments. It would also foster the marriages of more mature
couples with families and property; such couples desire assur-
ance that they are free to order their affairs as they wish.
These proposed standards employ concepts from both con-
tract and family law and would be familiar to the trial courts.
Finally, they give the practitioner concrete guidelines by
which to advise the client. The Kentucky Supreme Court im-
175 See KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
11 See KRS § 403.250(1) (Cune. Supp. 1982).
1 Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d at 711-12.
11 The standards' distinction between property and maintenance provisions is
modeled after Colorado's law, which includes statutes on property division and main-
tenance nearly identical to Kentucky's. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732-
36 (Colo. 1982).
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lied a willingness to reexamine its law in Jackson.17 9 It should
act upon this inclination at its next opportunity.
J. Clarke Keller
179 See note 16 supra.
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